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Developments since 2002 in Turkey lend support to the argument that there
are basically two forces that have enhanced the JDP government’s capacity
to attempt to alter the power balances through a serious reform program.
The first is the accumulated effect of globalized ideas on democracy, quality
of life and the markets, which have gathered force over the last 20 years and
have established in people’s minds the unquestionable standards of demo-
cratic rule. Against the backdrop of the penetration of such globalized
reflections, since the mid-1990s, in Turkey, there has been a threshold shift
in the definition of national security from external to internal threats to
Kurdish separatism and political Islam. That is, although threat levels are
perceived to be particularly high around Turkey’s immediate strategic
environment, major threats are considered domestic. The political auton-
omy of the Turkish military in its self-identified role as the custodian of
secular-Western parameters of the regime has been raised to a level which
allowed it free entry into public policy making via the National Security
Council. The regime’s preoccupation with national security policies in the
last two decades produced rigidity and fetishization in the official values of
the state, the most prominent ones being a monist interpretation of Turkish
identity and secularism. Consequently, state-centered politics considered
politics as a zero-sum-game with no room for negotiation and compromise
as the basis of effective governance.
Second, the JDP’s ascendance to power came at a juncture when inter-
national perception has highlighted Turkey’s usefulness to a Euro-Atlantic
partnership. This has helped the JDP government abandon an Islamic
model. Operating in a country with a long-held Western/secular identity
while sharing some history, culture, borders and religion with the Muslim
Middle East, the JDP’s ‘moderately’ Islamic character created a useful
combination with Turkey’s time-tested electoral democracy and staunch
defense of secularism. Moreover, there was the effect of the learning curve
of the JDP, which developed as a reaction to the establishment’s serious
crackdown on the predecessor party (WP) of Necmettin Erbakan in 1997,
which was subsequently closed and created disenchantment among the
party faithful. Synthesized together in the minds and memories of the JDP’s
founders, these factors helped them to pass the critical threshold for change
toward a ‘better’ democracy, political system and character and functions of
Turkey’s political Islam.
By appropriating the basically secular-Republican dream of ‘catching up
with the West’ through membership in the EU project, the JDP government
adopted a conservative-democrat as opposed to Muslim-democrat identity
and hoped to deflect any possible opposition that might come from secular
quarters. Simultaneously, it also bolstered the social and political aspirations
of upcoming social groups. This identity also appealed to the Westernized
liberal sectors that are not averse to a moderately Islamic political party
provided it has an overarching loyalty to liberal freedoms. Additionally, it
would also offer the JDP’s conservative voter base increased religious and
personal freedoms, not forgetting the fact that the EU project would also
make the principle of popular will effective.
What is original about the JDP’s adoption of a religious, conservative,
democratic, reformist and pro-European identity is not just its juxtaposition
of the central values of the Republic with conservative democratic standards.
In the initial plan of action, its transformative politics also aimed at drama-
tically altering the political power balance that has sustained the ancient
regime’s prominence, most notably that of the leading actor, the Turkish
military’s unusual political influence. Democratic reform requirements for
entry into the EU would provide the JDP with the means to break that
stagnant pattern.
Another key feature of adopting a ‘Europeanist’ foreign policy and a
‘reformist’ internal one was the strategies it offered to underpin effective
governance. The 1990s were marked by unclear, chaotic and failed policies,
as well as politicians incapable of coping with the social disparities, dis-
locations and identity claims created by the globalizing economy and
society. As the ‘creeping Islamization of Turkey’ is attributed to the strate-
gies of irresponsible, weak and inefficient political agents, politics was
understood as needing a dose of Kemalist moral injection. Regime ques-
tions were brought to the fore and concrete political issues and problems
were pushed aside. Public interest was framed as the ‘good’ forces against
‘evil,’ the victory of secularism against the creeping threat of Islamization,
or the feudalization of life. Politics relied on establishing legitimacy by
focusing on ‘internal threats.’ The remaining energy in politics was spent on
political opportunism and the mechanics of staying in power, which
involved not upsetting the status quo. The massive economic and social
crisis that the country was plunged into in February 2001 sapped even further
the strength of centrist politics and paved the way to more conservative poli-
cies and politicians until the elections of November 2002 declared the bank-
ruptcy of all spectrums.
It is true that in the last 20 years, most voters voted for change but in a
nebulous way, not really agreeing on a specific agenda but expecting an
efficient output, a convincing story that brings positive results to their own
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lives. In contrast, the JDP’s focus on accession to the EU has helped to
transform the negative inertia of the 1990s into a positive discourse relevant
for effective governance. With center-left and right in a coma, in the new era,
which began with the November 2002 elections, to be able to have staying
power, the JDP politicians had to do more than just deliver jobs and pros-
perity. Their primary focus would have to be on advancing a new project—
not challenging the hegemonic Kemalist one—in order to build effective
governance. The JDP’s EU-focused pro-Western policy priorities, however,
have served to provide a single coherent policy platform with parallel goals
to that of the Kemalist modernization paradigm. This was the first time in
two decades that politics had refused to become an appendix to neo-liberal
market reforms. The procedural requirements of democratic rule in line with
the EU’s ‘good practices’ and popular democratic support were used to add
credibility to the government’s desire to circumscribe especially the Turkish
Armed Forces’ sphere of political influence. This was done through a series
of reforms rolling back the functions and authority of the National Security
Council in August 2003.
As important as strong policy performance is, the new government had to
cope with social disparities, displacements, and despair caused by the process
of opening up and integrating with the world. This need was translated into
the language of effective governance in the form of policies of ‘equity’ and
corresponded to the ‘conservative’ streak in the party. The ‘political entre-
preneurship’ approach to politics, which indicates that the elected politician
appropriates an issue and deals with it to bring results, was, to some extent,
also influential in shaping the new agenda.
A genuine de-Islamization of the JDP was the crux of reshuffling Turkey’s
political players: indeed, in the first few years of its political life in office,
prioritizing democracy over security concerns did overcome the traditional
powerlessness of the civilian politicians. The question has arisen of whether
the Islamic pedigree of the party, the religious background of its leaders,
and the conservative-pious and sometimes conservative-Islamist voter con-
stituency would infuse Turkey’s secular public realm with more Islamic
symbols and practices. One way of answering this question is to look at the
core Islamist demands from the government. They have been reduced to
two areas: the alleviation of the grievances of headscarf-wearing students
who are banned from entering universities and granting freedom of educa-
tion for the graduates of Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools in terms of
allowing them to continue their education in universities. In other words,
rationalist and hedonistic perspectives derived from global capitalism cre-
ated the basis for bottom-up and de facto incentives for removing Islam
from the center stage of the reformist JDP. In addition, notwithstanding the
government’s ‘political’—not religious—practice of distributing patronage,
Turkish public administration is unequivocally framed in Westernist ideas
and secular values. Increased religious and personal freedoms cannot and
have not provided a new standard for the public administration.
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All this is not to ignore the politico-cultural values and convictions
that underpin the secular sectors’ intense fear and distrust of the political
profile of the JDP. Turkey’s history as well as the state-reforming promises of
the new identity of the JDP have caused tremendous fears and concerns in
the secular establishment, as well as in the secular-modern segments, about
an Islamic ‘hidden agenda’ of the government. These doubts and nervous-
ness have been translated into an effective campaign to undermine the gov-
ernment’s attempts to habituate the secular-modernists to its political
existence. There is a historical foundation for this: If one major problem
throughout the Republic was the fear of a breakup by the pull of non-
Turkish ethnics, the other has been the perceived threat of reaction,
obstruction, and subversion of the secular principle of the Republic by
Islamists. However, we need to also stress that the perception of Islamic
values and norms as the ‘negative other’ of the Republic were handed over
from the past as well as constructed by the whole socialization/education
system, which is overwhelmingly dominated by the Kemalist paradigm.
Therefore, it is quite right to say that the Islamic ‘threat’ amounts to more
than just the ‘objective presence’ of it.
However, in the history of the Republic, there have been changes in the
perceived threat, which have affected the strategy and nature of the response
by the secular establishment, showing that Kemalist political tradition and
practice are not fixed legacies with fixed strategies toward political Islam. The
history of the Republic has demonstrated a repertoire of diverse strategies,
ranging from political negotiation and compromise to repression toward poli-
tical Islam in upholding the fundamental aspects of the Kemalist ideology. In
other words, the two sides have deployed different strategies at different phases.
The question is with what incentives and purposes.
Since 2005, as negotiations with the EU proceeded, politically difficult
reforms on the expansion of democracy brought out the fault lines of the
JDP government and accelerated its rent-gathering activities that elicited
support from its power base. Criticism from the secular block, the EU lea-
ders/bodies and Turkey’s liberal sectors has served to demonstrate the severe
contradictions, ‘true conservative colors’ and reversals in the ruling party’s
policies. The party leaders turned to maintaining a ‘negative peace’ with
ultra-conservative and chauvinistic elements and to converging with the
secular establishment’s policies of promoting state interests at the expense of
individual freedoms. The policy shift from a democratic and peaceful solu-
tion to the Kurdish problem and from upholding freedom of expression are
perhaps the best examples of the JDP’s departure from its initial focus on
democracy promotion and its turn to a more pragmatic/safe/defensive
approach. The overarching objective being to promote its chances of win-
ning the double elections—presidential and parliamentary—in 1997, this
policy shift brought out the JDP’s system-supportive tenets and made clear
that the pursuit of a democratic agenda for the party was in fact more
difficult than it seemed.
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One can speak of a precarious balance of forces in Turkey in 2007: while
the historical roadmap of Turkey is acknowledged by all sides as pointing at
some kind of integration with Europe, the traditional power center’s concern
with revolving politics around state-centered and state-defined security,
identity, unity and foreign policy priorities remain intact. The interesting
paradox lies in the fact that the picture of ‘Turkey-as-resistance’ is juxta-
posed to another cheerful picture of ‘Turkey-as-adaptability’ to the democ-
racy-centered security architecture in post-Cold War Europe. The JDP
stands at the intersection of these two impressions. It stands at a historic
point of deciding whether to reverse its conservative right-wing shift back to
a direction in which the EU-generated democratic reforms are once more the
centerpiece of its discursive and policy achievements and are normalized as a
way of life for all actors inclusive of secular or anti-secular beliefs.
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